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T wo Texas Supreme Court cases in 1947 involved civil liability
for violation of "police regulation" type criminal statutes. In
Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co.1 the driver's license law' was
for the first time in Texas interpreted as fixing a legislative stand-
ard of conduct requiring the prudent man to refrain from know-
ingly allowing his car to be driven by an unlicensed driver. In
Schumacher v. City of Caldwell' plaintiff was allowed to recover
from the city for the negligent killing of his cow in spite of the
fact that the animal, when killed, was at large in apparent viola-
tion of a city ordinance. This mitigation of the severity of the
negligence per se doctrine was accomplished by interpreting the
city ordinance in such a manner that the plaintiff was held not
to have violated it and hence not contributorily negligent.
In the Pirie-Slaughter case, the plaintiff sought to recover dam-
ages resulting from a collision between his tractor-mower and the
'defendant's truck driven by defendant's unlicensed minor employee,
who was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident. The plaintiff sought to plead and prove that the
driver of defendant's truck did not have a driver's license and that
defendant knew or should have known this fact. The trial court sus-
tained a special exception to the pleading and excluded the evidence
on the ground that it was irrelevant, since the lack of a driver's
license could not have been the proximate cause of the accident.
This action was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Hart, reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that the pleading was proper and the evidence should have been
admitted.
... ...... 206 S. W. (2d) 587 (1947).
-Tix. Rzv. COv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 6687b, It 2, 10,36 44.
S-- Tex. _ 206 S. W. (2d) 243 (1947), Note, 26 Tx. L Rav. 681 (1948).
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The courts of other jurisdictions have given various legal effects
to the fact that the owner knew the operator did not have a license.
Decisions have varied from the position that such knowledge is
no evidence whatever that the owner is negligent' to the other
extreme of holding that violation of a statute prohibiting the
owner from entrusting his car to an unlicensed driver is negligence
per se.s Of course even in such jurisdictions it is still necessary for
the plaintiff to prove that the driver of the car was negligent and
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.'
Some courts have taken the middle ground, holding that such
knowledge is merely some evidence or prima facie proof of the
owner's negligence.'
Texas is committed to the view that violation of a criminal
statute is negligence per se,s not merely evidence of negligence.
Violation of a criminal statute entails civil liability if it appears
that the purpose of the statute was to set up a standard of conduct
for the protection of the class of persons to which the plaintiff
belongs against the type of harm which the statute seeks to
remedy.' In his opinion, Justice Hart held that the purpose of the
driver's license statute was "to secure a minimum of competence
and skill for drivers of automobiles and to fix a standard of
conduct for persons lending their automobiles to others to drive,
and that its principal aim is to afford some protection to the inter-
' E. g., Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N. E. 81 (1935). Kentucky even went so far as
to declare unconstitutional a statute making lack of license prima facie evidence of
negligence, on the ground that lack of a license had no "natural and rational evidentiary
relation to-or a logical tendency to prove the principal fact" of negligence. Tipton v.
Estill lee Co., 279 Ky. 793, 132 S. W. (2d) 347 (1939).
5 E. g., Cirosky v. Smathers, 128 S. C. 358, 122 S. E. 864 (1924) ; Walker v. Klopp, 99
Neb. 794, 157 N. W. 962 (1916). See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HABv.
L REv. 317 (1914).
6 Jacobs v. Hobson, 148 Kan. 107, 79 P. (2d) 861 (1938).
T E. g., Gordon v. Bedard, 265 Mass. 408, 164 N. E. 374 (1929) ; Austin v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 11 Misc. 292, 181 N. Y. S. 275 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, 1920). See
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MIN L REV. 361 (1932 1.
8 Davis v. Estes, 44 S. W. (2d) 952 (Tex. Com. App. 1932) ; Alpine Telephone Corp.
v. McCall, 143 Tex. 335, 184 S. W. (2d) 830 (19"4).
s Mundy v. Piie-S1aughter Motor CQ., 206 S. W. (2d) 587 at 590.
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ests of other persons on or near the public highways."1 Two con-
siderations apparently required this holding: (1) the statute
requires the applicant to pass an examination testing his fitness
and ability to operate motor vehicles on the public highways; (2)
the emergency clause of the enacting statute declared an emer-
gency by reason of the fact that the existing law was then inade-
quate "to curb the increasing fatalities due to improper driving.""U
The court distinguished the driver's license statute from those
statutes requiring licenses for identification or revenue purposes
only, such as the automobile registration statute. Violation of the
latter class of statutes would not, of course, entail civil liability.
In the course of his opinion, Justice Hart pointed out that the
statute would not be violated unless it were shown that the defend-
ant knew the driver had no license. However, negligence per se
aside, the plaintiff would still be entitled to plead and prove that
the defendant was negligent in the ordinary sense in that he should
have known that fact.
In view of the court's clear declaration of the purpose of the
driver's license statute, the door may be open to a holding that
the driver who lacks a license is himself negligent per se. It is
difficult to conceive, however, how a careful driver's lack of a
license could be either the cause in fact or the legal cause of a
plaintiff's damage.
Schumacher v. City of Caldwell" illustrates one method by
which the Texas Supreme Court, in spite of being committed to
the doctrine of negligence per se, has found it possible to evade the
doctrine where such evasion is necessary to reach a just result.
The plaintiff's cow, tethered by a chain fastened to a car axle
driven in the ground on the plaintiff's property in the city of
Caldwell, became frightened during a thunderstorm, broke the
chain and escaped. She was electrocuted by a high-tension wire
1o Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 206 S. W. (2d) 243 (1947).
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which had been broken during a storm three days previously. The
city had permitted this wire to remain on the ground. There was
a city ordinance making it unlawful for cattle to run at large in
the city limits. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiff for
$135. The Galveston Court of Civil Appeals reversed"3 and held
that the city was not liable because the animal was running at
large in violation of a city ordinance when the injury occurred,
which was contributory negligence per se.1"
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals and
affirmed the recovery allowed by the trial court. The court stated
that had the owner violated the city ordinance by permitting his
cow to run at large the city would be liable only for gross negli-
gence in causing the death of the cow. However, in this case the
cow escaped through no fault of the owner. Therefore the city was
held liable for ordinary negligence in causing the cow's death.
In reaching its decision the court relied upon a Texas Supreme
Court case15 and a civil appeals case"6 construing county stock laws
as requiring fault of the owner in permitting the stock to run at
large to establish violation. The court also cited two civil appeals
cases1" to the same effect involving municipal ordinances prohibit-
ing animals from running at large.
The Texas Supreme Court is definitely opposed to any further
extension of the doctrine of liability without fault."8 An obdurate
application of the doctrine of negligence per se to situations where
the violation of the statute is clearly reasonable under the circum-
stances, however, results in the imposition of liability without
fault. The "fault" in such exceptional cases is technical only." In
is On authority of Dallas Gas Co. v. Wheat, 160 S. W. 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), no
writ ol error history.
14 204 S. W. (2d) 471 (1947).
13 Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Webb, 102 Tex. 210, 114 S. W. 1171 (1908).
s ]Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Decatur Cotton Seed Oil Co., 179 S. W. 1104 (1915).
17 Ellis v. Lewis, 142 S. W. (2d) 294 (1940) ; Presnall v. Raley, 27 5. W. 200 (1894).
1s Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S. W. (2d) 221 (1936).
iS Thus, when a collision with a child on skates can apparently be avoided by pulling
to the left side of the road, it would be folly to obey the statute by holding to the right.
Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 P. 684 (1920).
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a number of cases20 the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals have re-
fused to apply the doctrine of negligence per se to such situa-
tions.2 Such holdings have gained widespread approval.22 Doubt
has been cast on their weight, however, by a recent civil appeals
decision in which the court refused to consider whether the de-
fendant had acted reasonably in the face of an admitted violation
of a traffic law. 3
The Schumacher case represents an alternative technique by
which the injustice of an indiscriminate application of the negli-
gence per se doctrine may be avoided. The criminal statute is in-
terpreted as requiring culpability as an element of the offense,
even though it does not in terms do so, and is clearly one of that
class of police regulations in which culpability is immaterial in
criminal prosecutions. Fear has been expressed that such inter-
pretation of a criminal statute in a civil case may embarrass crim-
inal prosecutions under such statutes.2 It is submitted, however,
that in view of our dual supreme court system there is little like-
lihood that criminal courts will regard themselves as bound by
such decisions in civil proceedings.
NUISANCE
One 1947 case re-emphasizes that it is not necessary to prove
negligence in order to recover for a private nuisance. In the case
of Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen,25 the plaintiff recovered in
-0 See list of "excused violation" cases in Note, 25 Tax. L. Rav. 424 (1947).
"1 Thus in Taber v. Smith, the lights failed on the defendlant'r truck. Diligent search
failed to disclose a garage which could send a tow-car that night. The truck was a hazard
as it stood. There was a garage only 400 feet away, however. Defendant therefore ordered
his servant to proceed with the truck at slow speed, on the extreme right of the road, to
the garage. While proceeding in such fashion the plaintiff collided with the rear of the
truck and sued for damages. The plaintiff recovered in the trial court because the tech-
nical violation of the statute prohibiting operation without lights was considered negli-
gence per se. The court of civil appeals reversed on the ground that the defendant
exercised due care under the circumstances. 26 S. W. (2d) 722 (1930).
22 Note, 25 Tax.L. Rav. 424 (1947). Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to
Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L REv. 453, 459 (1932).
23 Herrin v. Falcon, 198 S. W. (2d) 117 (1946), writ of error refused, N. R. E.
24 Note, 26 Tax. L REv. 681, 682 (1948).
25 199 S. W. (2d) 825 (Galveston Ct. of Civ. App., 1947), writ of error refused.
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the trial court on the theory that the defendant's operation of his
carbon black plant, which resulted in the deposit of soot on plain-
tiff's home, was a private nuisance. The plaintiff did not attempt
to allege or prove negligence. The defendant attacked this re-
covery in the court of civil appeals on the ground that negligence
of the defendant was necessary to support such recovery. The court
held that negligence is not necessary to support recovery for nui-
sance, except where the act or condition complained of can become
a nuisance solely by reason of the negligent manner in which it
is performed or permitted. This accords with the reasoning of
Prosser 6 and the Restatement of Torts2" that nuisance is properly
a field of tort liability referring to the type of interest (use or
enjoyment of land) invaded rather than a type of tortious conduct.
Nuisance may result from conduct intended to cause harm, from
negligent conduct, or from ultrahazardous activity even though
carefully performed. In the principal case, as in the great major-
ity of nuisance cases, the conduct was intentional. It was a nui-
sance because the jury found it to be an unreasonable interference
with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land.
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATrER OF LAW (RAILROAD
CROSSING ACCIDENTS)
Whether certain conduct constitutes negligence or contributory
negligence or not is of course usually a question of fact for the
jury. Occasionally, however, where the facts are undisputed and
only one reasonable inference can be drawn, the courts declare
negligence to exist as a matter of law, regardless of jury findings.
Such cases are always of interest to lawyers, since they purport
to lay down a rule of law. They appear to add an element of cer-
tainty to the uncertain field of negligence. The appearance is mis-
leading, as is shown by the short life of the "stop, look, and if nec-
essary get out of the vehicle" rule announced by Mr. Justice
26 Possa oN TorTS 553 (1941).
21 Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter 40, RzsTATEMENT op Torm 215 (1939).
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Holmes in the Goodman case.2s Mr. Justice Holmes purported to
lay down his rule "once for all," but only seven years later the
decision of that case was limited to its particular facts. The rule
requiring the prudent man to get out of his vehicle if his view of
the crossing was obstructed was held to have been dictum and was
disapproved.29
In the 1947 Texas Supreme Court case of Texas & N. 0. R. Co.
v. Burden" the majority of the court reversed a recovery by the
plaintiff for the death of her husband, holding that the decedent
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The
accident occurred at a public crossing in the town of Diboll. A
freight train was stopped on a siding to await the passing of a
passenger train. The freight train was cut in two at the crossing
to permit traffic to pass. The front car of the rear section of the
freight train was an immigrant car. The decedent held a conver-
sation with the caretaker of the immigrant car. According to the
caretaker, the deceased remarked that it was about time for
Number 25 to pass through, and he would have to be going; he
stepped around the front of the car and onto the main track,
where he was killed by the passenger train. A colored brakeman
stationed at the crossing to stop traffic called to him to stop. The
decedent looked toward the brakeman, then hurried his step, or,
according to the brakeman, jumped onto the main track into the
path of the passenger train. The jury found the defendant railroad
negligent in various respects, such as excessive speed and failure
to sound a bell and whistle at the proper times. They also found
that the deceased was not negligent. The lower court gave judg-
ment for substantial damages. The recovery was approved by the
Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals."'
The majority of the Supreme Court held" that the testimony
28 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927).
29 Pokora v. Wabash R. Co., 292 U. S. 98 (1934).
30 146 Tex ....... 203 S. W. (2d) 522 (1947).
81 196 S. W. (2d) 707 (1946).
32 With Chief Justice Alexander and Justices Taylor, Sharp and Simpson dissenting.
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of the caretaker of the immigrant car conclusively established that
the deceased knew of the approach of the train; that the only rea-
sonable interpretation, therefore, of his actions after the warning
by the brakeman was that he decided to substitute his judgment
for that of the brakeman; that such conduct was an utter failure
to use any care for his own safety and was contributory negli.
gence as a matter of law. 3
The dissent was based partly on the questionable nature of the
majority holding that, in effect, the jury were required to believe
the uncontradicted testimony of the caretaker tending to prove
that the deceased knew the train was coming. This, however, is not
the place for a discussion of the law of evidence on the province
of the jury in weighing evidence and determining credibilty of
witnesses."
The dissent also took issue with the conclusion that contributory
negligence was established as a matter of law. There was evidence
tending to show that the freight train made a noise as if it were
about to couple up just as the deceased passed between the two
parts of the freight train. It was, therefore, entirely possible that
the attention of the deceased was distracted from the real source
of danger by this noise and by the brakeman's warning. He. may
have interpreted the warning as being against the danger of being
crushed between the two parts of the freight train. This theory
would explain why he hurried away from the side track and onto
the main track. If the jury believed this to be the true state of
facts, as apparently they did, they properly found that the dece-
dent was not negligent.3"
It would appear that reasonable minds could differ as to the
conclusions to be drawn form the evidence. It seems, then, that the
majority erred in laying down a rule of prudent conduct where
the situation of the deceased is in dispute. Is it not possible that
83 Citing Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gaddis, 208 S. W. 895 (Tex. Com. App. 1919) as
controlling authority.
34 For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see the section on Evidence, this issue.
so See Kirksey v. Southern Traction Co., 110 Tex. 190, 217 S. W. 139 (1919).
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a prudent man, believing what the evidence shows the decedent
may have believed, would have acted precisely as he did? If so,
then the question of his negligence should have been left with
the jury.
C.R.W.
